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ABSTRACT 
Exploring the introduction of speech recognition, an 
intelligent software system, in the ACT Magistrates Court 
promted questioning of the notion of agency.  In this 
paper we look to sociology for conceptions of agency that 
emphasise the materiality of agency, the mutuality of 
human and non-human co-constructions of agency, and 
the performativity of agency. Far from being marked by 
autonomy and independence, agency can more usefully 
be conceived as the outcome of the relatedness of human 
to human, human to non-human and non-human to non-
human.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As 21st century inhabitants of postmodern societies, when 
we think about speech recognition systems most of us 
will call to mind personal encounters with automatic 
telephone systems. Some of us may be talking to 
computers at work: my cousin talks to the paintshop 
computer to coordinate his team at a local car 
manufacturer, much easier than using a keyboard when 
his hands are smeared with paint and full of gear; my 
research assistant uses Dragon Naturally Speaking re-
speaking interviews into the computer to get them into 
text; my friend works for the public service and a recent 
bout of RSI sent her to her occupational health and safety 
team to be set up with IBM Via Voice so that she can 
return to work; and I have heard about radiographers who 
regularly dictate their highly specialised reports to 
computers and then print them out (Kraal 2006). Whether 
it is talking to machines with limited vocabularies like 
those deployed for telephone bill paying or at my 
cousin’s paintshop, or using speech recognition systems 
that ‘understand’ natural speech, talking to machines is no 
longer something strange and futuristic. For the science 
fiction enthusiasts amongst us the practical space for 
speech recognition systems had already been prepared, 
their representations in films and TV series was 
ubiquitous from 2001 a Space Odessey to Star Trek. 
Whilst our practical experience may not live up to these 
on screen representations, it is likely that we nevertheless 
imagine a future time when they will, when our speech 
recognition systems are smarter.  
The imaginary invoked by both our fantasy and practical 
worlds is one of the ‘transmigration of agency’. This term 
is Lucy Suchman’s, coined to remind us of the challenge 
to the widespread conceptualisation of agency that 
represents agency as unique to humans, and according to 
which an individual human consciousness is always the 
originator of action; how often have you heard the slogan 
that it is people not guns that do the shooting (Suchman 
2002). In western, popular, commonsense understandings 
of the world, agency is what separates humans from 
machines whose proper place is to be used by humans or 
designed by humans according to some prior intention. 
Agency implies the freedom humans have to make 
choices and to act. According to this way of thinking the 
boundary between humans and machines, machines are 
extensions of our physical capabilities, mere tools, and 
hence humans are responsible for both the good or bad 
outcomes that follow from the development and 
absorbtion into society of new technologies.  That this 
imaginary structuring the human machine dichotomy and 
modern cultural understandings of what it means to be 
human is under challenge and that this shift stirs up 
anxiety is demonstrated by the success of films such as I 
Robot. The discourse of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
emphasises the intelligent, interactive computer system 
that can converse with us, respond to our needs without 
being asked, interact emotionally with us, and can watch 
and learn without receiving specific instructions. These 
intelligent machines are represented as mimicking human 
cognitive processes and thus as having agency. Indeed as 
Suchman points out there has been a convergence in the 
language of cognitive psychology and AI with 
borrowings going both ways. Not surprisingly then, given 
the rhetoric of intelligent machines and their 
materialisation in the everyday worlds we inhabit, the 
idea that agency is unique to humans is losing its 
saliency. For many people the idea that humans uniquely 
author the action in the world no longer makes sense, and 
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we are not surprised to be sharing our worlds with 
machines that appear to have the capacity for agency, that 
is for autonomous, rational action; hence the 
transmigration of agency.  
This is not an abstract question. We became interested in 
new ways of thinking the association of humans and 
machines because of our experience in a practical project. 
This paper originated with an investigation into the 
workings of the ACT Magistrates Court with the long-
term view of introducing automatic speech recognition to 
the Court. 
The argument we present here is that new and richer 
conceptualisations of agency itself, the boundary between 
human and machine agency, and distributions of agency 
across that boundary are needed to make sense of life in 
our postmodern worlds, particularly for those of us  
working on technological change. In particular, we want 
to explore how new conceptualisations of agency and the 
human/non-human divide can inform our work in 
developing new technologies for specific organisational 
contexts. We will use speech recognition as an example 
of an AI system and a study of the feasibility of 
introducing speech recognition into the ACT magistrates 
court to test how new conceptualisations of agency can 
make a difference. 
THE ACT MAGISTRATES COURT 
Many things happen in the ACT Magistrates Court. But 
here we will restrict our concern to the act of sentencing, 
for it is for the act of sentencing that the ACT Chief 
Magistrate would like to use Speech Recognition to 
replace handwriting. In the ACT Magistrates Court 
magistrates write down their decisions after speaking 
them aloud to the courtroom. These decisions may be 
interim decisions in a case, for example, to release a 
defendant on bail pending more information, or final 
decisions, for example a jail sentence or fine. The current 
paper-based system for capturing a magistrate’ remarks 
during sentencing relies on the bench sheet and the 
defendant’s folder. A bench sheet is a piece of blank A4 
paper that a magistrate writes on while sitting at the 
bench. The bench sheet will typically contain notes made 
during the case and the interim or final decisions in the 
case, or part of a case that the magistrate has just heard. A 
defendant’s folder may come to contain many bench 
sheets as a case progresses. 
The defendant’s folder is a coloured manila folder affixed 
with a label with a case number, the defendant’s name 
and the informant’s name. The informant is typically the 
police officer who made the arrest and caused the 
defendant to appear in Court. A defendant will typically 
have one folder in use at any one time and efforts are 
made to ensure that new defendant+informant pairs are 
not created while a defendant’s case is being heard. If it is 
at all possible, each folder is assigned to one magistrate to 
ensure continuity. 
When a magistrate delivers their verdict, or announces a 
close to a part of a case, or sets a case over to another 
time, they speak the decision aloud to the courtroom and 
write the decision down on a bench sheet which is then 
inserted into the defendant’s folder for the case at hand. 
For example, the Magistrate might declare loudly to the 
court:  
Pursuant to section 402 of the crimes act, having regard to 
character and circumstances, without conviction the defendant 
will be discharged on recognisance self of $2000 to be of good 
behaviour for six months. Included in that are court costs of $52 
and the CIC levy of $50. 
 
 For long or complex sentences, this process of writing 
out sentences on the bench is very time consuming both 
for magistrates and for all other parties in court who must 
wait for the writing to be completed. There are also others 
in the court hurriedly scribbling down what the 
Magistrate has said; there is a  4 week delay before 
written copies of the sentence are supplied to those who 
need it –– police, remand, mental health, community 
detention. 
 
It would be easy to think of agency in the situation of the 
Magistrates Court as lying with the Magistrate. Certainly 
the defendant will breathe a sigh of relief and be free to 
walk out of the court and get on with his or her life if a 
sentence such as that above is uttered. A different 
sentence would see the defendant being led from the court 
to the cells ready for transporting to a prison where they 
would be required to serve a custodial sentence, or 
perhaps wait until a mental health assessment had been 
completed and a report lodged with the court for the 
Magistrate to determine the sentence at a later date.  
Sitting in court we are reminded by all the symbolics of 
power that the Magistrate holds the seat of power, all that 
rising when the Magistrate enters the court, the 
positioning of the Magistrate at a raised bench in the front 
from which the court and all that are seated there are 
gazed down upon, and the dressing of the magistrate in 
gown and sometimes wig.   
A SOCIOLOGICAL DIVERSION: THE 
AGENCY/STRUCTURE DEBATE 
There have, of course, been many challenges to the model 
of individual agency that came to dominate modernity, 
and this challenge has intensified under conditions of 
postmodernity, a term I will use here to refer to the post-
industrial character of 21st century economically 
developed societies where capital expansion relies on 
workers in informatized, knowledge and cultural 
industries (Castells 1996). Intelligent machines have 
become ubiquitous, humans increasingly survive through 
melding with artefacts from pacemakers to stem cells and 
from the internet to mobile phones, and individual 
identities in everyday lives have become less stable and 
more fragmented as we juggle multiple roles - parent, 
student, worker, carer, environmental activist, drag-
queen, car club secretary. All of these changes in our 
social worlds challenge the deeply rooted Western notion 
that agency is unique to the Descartian mind, a singular, 
coherent mind fundamentally separated from its physical 
and bodily environment and its ‘being-in-the-world’. This 
is not to say that challenges to the rationalist conception 
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of agency are new, indeed they have long been at the 
heart of sociology, certainly predating debates about 
modernity and postmodernity. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to survey all challenges to the conception of 
agency as mentalistic intention. Rather the paper looks to 
sociology and to social studies of science and technology 
for conceptions of agency of value to the study of 
technological change in organisations.   
Mid-twentieth century sociology, as is well known, was 
characterised by a divide between micro- and macro-
sociology, between the privileging of agency and the 
privileging of structure (Abercrombie, Hill et al. 2000). 
Macro-sociology privileged structure, arguing that 
sociology should concern itself not with individuals but 
with social facts – structures, institutions, roles and norms 
- since individual agency is a function of such established 
social patterns; micro interactions are the way they are 
because of the larger social forces that impinge on them. 
Micro-sociology privileged agency, seeing the action of 
individuals as constitutive of social structures that only 
appear to be fixed and enduring, to act as forces shaping 
the future, because they are continuously being recreated 
through the recurrent actions of free and creative 
individuals.  There have been many ways suggested for 
resolving the agency/structure contradiction in sociology. 
Berger and Luckman (Berger and Luckman 1971) 
emphasise the dialectical interplay in which the shared 
meanings achieved through social interaction in one 
generation become institutionalised to shape the 
interactions of the next generation. Gidden’s structuration 
theory emphasises the ‘duality of structure’, individuals 
are free to reflexively remake their social life, but they do 
so through mobilising and engaging with historical 
resources that determine, for example, whether and how 
an action will be interpreted by others, however these 
resources are not external to individual agents but are 
already and always constituted through social action 
(Giddens 1984). 
These attempts to combine the macro (structure) and 
micro (agency) traditions in sociology point to, as Latour 
has more recently indicated, the dissatisfactions of a focus 
on local person-to-person interactions that omit the 
influence of the wider social context that make the 
situation and interaction what it is, and simultaneously 
avoid the dissatisfactions of a focus on the larger social 
picture that tells us nothing of how it is experienced and 
woven through local situations (Latour 1999). Latour 
suggests that rather than attempting to overcome and 
resolve this tension between agency and structure in 
sociology, that we by-pass it; rather than attempting to 
continue a sociological tradition of grand theorizing, of 
seeking ‘the Big Animal’ or ‘anonymous field of forces’ 
that stand behind and make sense of the local situation, 
that we recast social structures as a ‘summing up’ of 
various local agents, practices, devices and connections 
(Latour 1999). Making sense of agency thus becomes a 
matter of following the connections and transformations 
that make the exercise of agency possible. Latour urges 
us to investigate and follow ‘what provides actants with 
their agency’, the very word actant pointing to choice and 
intentionality not as individual human attributes, but as 
being conferred on actors because of their position in a 
network. Latour is, as many will know, one of the major 
proponents of the actor-network approach to sociology, 
an approach that began in science and technology studies. 
John Law, also a proponent of actor network theory, 
demonstrates this deconstructive approach to agency in 
his discussion of managers and power (Law 1997): 
…the powers of the body – or of the mind – are the least part of 
it. The least part of the power of the powerful. 
The powers of the powerful manager … these are extended. 
Spread out. Distributed. They are distributed through the 
arrangements of the organisation. They arise from those 
arrangements. The people who do the work of subordinating 
themselves. Secretaries. The tiers of under-managers. The 
clerks. The technicians. All those people. But not just the 
people. For the powers of the powerful manager lie also in the 
papers. The texts that fix the commands. That map the 
organisation, its financial health, its credibility. They lie in the 
funds that circulate through the narrow networks of finance, 
oiling the wheels, promising, persuading, seducing. And in the 
technologies which remember. Which calculate. Which write. 
Which talk to the other end of the business or to the other end 
of the world.  
ANALYSING THE AGENCY OF THE SENTENCING 
MAGISTRATE 
We began our studies of the ACT Magistrates Court by 
attending to the everyday achievement of sentencing. 
How is it that the reordering of the world is performed 
into being by the Magistrates utterance of the sentence? 
We had some clues from the work of 
ethnomethodologists such as Harvey Sacks (Sacks 1992). 
Analysing how the meaning of a word like “hello” is 
produced, Sacks argued that the meaning of an utterance 
does not derive from any a priori set of rules, but rather 
from its situated location, its relationality to a host of 
other elements. “Hello” is taken to be a greeting when 
spoken at the beginning of a conversation or to greet a 
new arrival, but uttered as an exclamation in the middle 
of a sentence – “well hello’ – it takes on an entirely 
different meaning. Lucy Suchman Similarly, the utterance 
of a judicial sentence constitutes an act of sentencing only 
when it is organised in a particular way – it has to be 
pronounced by a magistrate, at the end of a hearing of the 
case, in a space constituted as a court, using certain words 
and phrases that would sound out-of place in any other 
setting. The agency of the magistrate to change the world, 
at least of the defendant but possibly also of the prison-
warder and the drug counselor, is thus contingent and 
organized through interaction. The power of the utterance 
relies on the achievement of its inter-subjective 
understanding as a sentence by the magistrate, the police, 
the defendant, the prison system and so forth. 
But our interest in how the agency of the sentence was 
constituted in the situated action of the court, in its world 
of mundane events and routines soon led us in a number 
of other directions. The power of the sentence, the agency 
of the Magistrate, were being constituted and 
reconstituted through myriad acts carried out 
unthinkingly, acts so taken-for-granted as just ‘what we 
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do here’ that they mostly went un-noticed and un-
remarked by the magistrates, lawyers and law academics 
who talked to us about sentencing. We have already 
talked of some of the acts of non-humans mundanely 
incorporated into each act of sentencing – the bench sheet 
and the defendant’s folder. The production of the written 
sentence might also be assisted by the use of a rubber 
stamp. Occassionally there is just the right stamp that 
simply requires the magistrate to fill in lets say the time 
period for which the defendant’s license is to be 
suspended, or the time period of a custodial sentence and 
whether it is partially or fully suspended. But more often 
than not there are many details to be added by hand – a 
requirement that the defendant attend drug rehabilitation 
at a particular facility, or the lengthy detailing of the 
times during a week when the defendant can drive 
provisionally so as to allow them to attend classes and 
drive to and from work.  
The magistrate sits in the court surrounded by people but 
also by objects. Where would he or she be without the 
police report, the case laid out by the prosecutor, the 
presentation of the defendant or of his solicitor, but also 
of the imposing bench, the benchsheet, the defendant’s 
folder, the stamps and pen. And there is more. A mix of 
humans and non-humans.  
There is the Magistrate’s Associate. Before the 
Magistrates Court session opens the Magistrate’s 
Associate has checked that all the defendant’s folders are 
there, that they are complete, stacked in order, and that 
inside each one the documents are organized in the order 
most helpful to the magistrate – today’s charge sheet, an 
affidavit setting out the evidence of a police interview in 
which an assault police charge is discussed, bail 
documents.  Also ordered in the folder are the reports 
produced by a number of agencies external to the Court, 
reports that can encompass a defendant’s mental health, 
drug or alcohol dependency and so on, reports that find 
their way into the defendant’s folder and are ready for 
defendant’s sentencing appearance. When the Magistrates 
Court is underway the Magistrates Associate is kept busy 
passing folders up to the Magistrate at the Bench, 
conferring with the prosecutor or the defendant’s solicitor 
and retrieving additional documents from them for the 
Magistrate to consider and for adding to the defendant’s 
file. There is an ordering in the court, defendants are 
called one after the other, beginning with those brought in 
from the cells. The order follows the list thumb-tacked to 
the pin-up board in the corridor leading to the front foyer. 
The Magistrates Associate has the files in the same order. 
How is this order produced? There are others whose work 
in the “backroom” has scheduled defendants to appear at 
this time in this court. It is the List Clerk’s job to ensure 
that the court dates are filled as efficiently as possible. 
The List Clerk has worked with the monitor’s list and 
court’s computer system to construct the rosters for the 
hearings in a particular court on a particular day before a 
particular magistrate. The Monitor works in a small booth 
between the walls of the courtrooms. The booth looks in 
to two court rooms, one on each side, through one-way 
glass and seats, computers and closed-circuit 
monitors. One of the jobs done by the Monitor is to note 
down the Magistrate’s decisions, including decisions to 
schedule a return to court for a defendant. 
 
Here we are beginning to see an army of invisible 
workers to whom work is delegated and whose work 
makes sentencing possible. And there is an invisible 
infrastructure too – the courts scheduling interface system 
that makes it possible for the list Clerk to do their job, the 
pre-produced list of cases that allows the Monitor to 
quickly record decisions and the shorthand and cryptic 
stock of phrases use to do so because they are 
intersubjectively understood by others who rely on them 
to do their jobs. The agency of the magistrate does not 
exist in isolation.  The sentence is distributed, it is 
decentred – the effect of a network of relations (Law 
1994), an outcome of the ordering of the court, of the 
coordination of many small acts – acts of workers, acts of 
things, and acts of symbols, marks on paper, digital 
signals, spoken words1. As Haraway’s cultural studies of 
the history of science have taught us, agency is an 
outcome of the intermeshing of materials, meanings and 
practices (Haraway 1997). The power of the sentence is 
the outcome of the co-ordination of the work of multiple 
inter-dependent humans and non-humans, located in 
different but overlapping situations. Moreover, all too 
often in the hypervisibility of the one positioned as the 
decision-maker, as having agency centered on their 
utterance, their act of judgement, their floating brain, the 
work of the administrators, the clerks, the technicians, 
and of the carefully crafted materials circulating in an 
organization disappears, and it is not incidental that this 
division has a gender dimension (Bowker and Star 1999).    
 Then of course, there is the defendant. How did each one 
get here, and most with a lawyer, either their own or the 
Court’s duty lawyer. Perhaps there has been an arrest, and 
a defendant was held for the weekend in the police cells 
only now being brought before the Magistrate. Certainly 
there has been a summons served by a police officer 
following an incident where police were called or were 
present – a speeding charge, driving over the limit, a 
theft, an assault. More people, more things, some big, 
some small – the police-officer, the State budget 
allocation that pays the police officer’s salary, the 
breathalyzer, the summons, the cell in which the 
defendant has been restrained, the police station, the 
computer at the police station on which the defendant’s 
statement has been typed with 2 fingers. All of this stands 
behind the presence of the defendant in court, makes it 
possible. And without the defendant there would be no 
sentence. 
                                                          
1 This resonates with Hutchins work on ‘distributed 
cognition’ Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. 
Canbridge, Ma, The MIT Press. 
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Some of these elements fit the modernist conception of 
structure but they are not abstract entities following a 
trajectory, a grand narrative – police acting in the 
interests of capital, the State protecting people’s freedoms 
and advancing their progress. They are present in the 
organization of the Court, the Police standing around, 
bored, not available for other duties because they may be 
called, if the case is heard today, if the defendant pleads 
guilty. There is ambiguity here, contradictions, not a 
monolithic actor coherently and externally organized and 
standing outside the situation. There are other ‘Big 
Animals’ too but they are not equivalent to the social 
structures that macro-sociology saw as determining the 
action and agency of individuals and organizations. There 
is the Magistrates Court building, modern, dignified 
without being overly imposing. On the front is a Coat of 
Arms: ‘for the queen, the law, and the people’. Big actors 
– the State that paid for the building, the laws passed by 
Parliament and interpreted in the heavy tomes of case law 
that we occasionally saw the magistrate pull from the 
shelf beside the bench, not even the Constitution with its 
codification of the powers of the judicial system and rules 
for appointing the judiciary, but we cannot simply move 
from the Magistrate to one of these Big actors to account 
for the power of the sentence to change the world, 
shifting agency from individual to society. These bigger 
actors are inside the Court, are embeddedded in its 
‘modes of ordering’ (Law 1994), but they too are 
distributed, decentred and fragmentary. Rather than lying 
behind and accounting for the agency of the Magistrate, 
they are embodied, partial and constituted in the agency 
of the Magistrate. Their agency in relation to that of the 
Magistrate is itself a matter for empirical investigation.   
To return to the matter of agency, our first lesson, to use 
Suchman’s terminology, is that the modern ‘imaginary’ 
for agency in which the magistrate is ‘configured’ as 
autonomous mind needs to be ‘re-figured’. The agency of 
the Magistrate is not contained within a single individual. 
Separated from the Court building, the Constitution, the 
beautiful blonde wood-paneled bench, the heavy tomes of 
case law, the bench sheet, the defendant’s folder, the 
reports, the affidavit, the Magistrate’s Associate, the List 
Clerk the magistrate’s power to act disappears. The 
Magistrate utters the sentence and it changes the world, 
but the sentence is a node in a network, and so too is the 
magistrate, his memory, his calculus, his capacity to 
project the sentence into the world in the court, but also 
for instance to the roadside when the defendant is driving 
his car after his license is suspended. 
ANALYSING THE AGENCY OF SPEECH 
RECOGNITION 
Speech recognition systems are figured as intelligent and 
interactive, as able to respond intelligently to verbal 
instructions, to learn from mistakes so they improve in 
accuracy when spoken to by a particular human, and to 
engage in conversation with us. In this Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) imaginary it is the autonomous agency 
of the modernist imaginary, previously thought to be 
unique to humans, that developers of speech recognition 
systems configure as migrating into their machines.  
Speech recognition is assumed to be a more “natural” 
way of interacting with a computer because speech is one 
way in which people interact with each other. Using a 
speech recognition system is imagined as one rational 
autonomous agent interacting with another. The largest 
problem with speech recognition systems is that they are 
error-prone in their interaction. Usability studies of 
speech recognition systems have tended to focus on the 
rates of recognition errors. Users in several studies have 
reported that they did not like using a speech recognition 
system because of it’s errorful nature (Karat, Halverson et 
al.; Lai and Vergo 1997; Antiles, Hornberger et al. 2004). 
 
The focus for developers of speech recognition systems 
has been largely on improving recognition rates. 
Useability has been seen as a relatively straightforward 
task of overcoming the limitations of the machine by 
improving the algorithms used to govern the autonomous 
action of the agent in carrying out functions of search, 
recognition, learning and problem-solving. Certainly 
creating reliable speech recognition systems with 
improved accuracy  rates has been important. However as 
accuracy rates are now approaching rates where 
improvements may not be detectable until they are 100% 
(Van Buskirk and La Lomia 1995), it is perhaps timely to 
re-look at earlier work on the importance of factors 
external to the speech recognition software (Rollins, 
Constantine et al. 1983). Treating the speech recognition 
system as a separate, self-contained, autonomous agent 
has favoured a focus on the algorithms of speech 
recognition and error correction, to the exclusion of 
situational factors and the task at hand. Perhaps this 
tendency to keep large vocabulary speech recognition 
systems in the laboratory has in part been influenced by 
transmigrating the modernist notion of human agency to 
the AI system of speech recognition. Early on in our 
research we became aware that the question of integrating 
speech recognition into the ACT Magistrates Court was 
not a question about the agency of the system as an 
autonomous, discrete entity able to seamlessly turn the 
magistrate’s speech in sentencing into flawless written 
text. 
Speech Recognition Systems are often represented as 
enhancing human lives because they mimic human 
agency, at least its modernist autonomous image. For 
instance Alister Rennie, a vice president of IBM 
Pervasive Computing attributes a car based speech 
recognition system with the capacity for autonomous, 
interactive agency – interacting with the system while 
driving is presented as if it were no different from 
conversing with a fellow human: ‘If you ask for 
directions to an Italian restaurant, it can find the 
restaurant, display the review on a screen or read the 
review back to you while you drive’ (Murray 2004). 
When Polanyi claimed that Speech Recognition Systems 
are ‘the court technology for the 21st century’(Polansky 
1997), he is not imaging the awkward systems still used 
in some U.S. courts which require their users to respeak 
every word so that it can be turned into written text, and 
to do so whilst wearing an awkward gas-mask like 
contraption that protects the system from other noise in 
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the court, and even then has a far from perfect accuracy 
rate (Buckley 2002). He undoubtedly envisages a system 
able to understand and respond to human conversation as 
flawlessly as HAL, the computer from 2001 a Space 
Odyssey, who might be mad and so autonomous as to 
commit murder, but who never makes an error in either 
recognizing speech or producing it.   
 
In this vision of Speech Recognition Systems the 
containment of agency within a single individual – even a 
machinic individual – obscures the assemblage of human 
and non-human elements that make agency possible, 
whether that agency is human or machine. What 
disappears is the materiality and relationality of the 
sentence. Speech recognition systems seek to hide this –  
the translation of sound-waves into electronic impulses, 
their matching against an existing sound bank and 
conversion into clean black marks on white paper are 
deliberately hidden from view. All kinds of materials and 
practices are made invisible. It is not that we have a 
problem with this hiding of the huge assemblage of 
algorithms, semiotics and engineering, our plea is more 
modest: That in delegating the agency of the Magistrate’s 
spoken remarks to the written agency of the Speech 
Recognition System that we keep sight of the backroom 
workers and existing material networks that produce the 
Magistrate’s agency. We may then be able to get some 
assistance in ensuring that any notoriously disobedient 
Speech Recognition System introduced into the 
Magistrates Court might remain faithful, and we might 
avoid the notoriety of HAL not being blinded by 
misguided visions of agency.    
CONCLUSION 
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